Military or civilian personnel seconded to the institutions of the European Union may detain and carry weapons in accordance with Article 13 when working with staffs or armed forces that may be made available to the European Union in the preparation and execution of tasks, including exercises, subject to Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the European Union, or whether they participate in missions related to these tasks. The political issue of SOFA is complicated by the fact that many host countries have mixed feelings about foreign bases on their soil and that SOFA renegotiation requests are often linked to calls for a total withdrawal of foreign troops. Issues of different national practices may arise – while the United States and host countries in general agree on what constitutes a crime, many American observers believe that the host country`s judicial systems offer much lower protection than the United States and that the host country`s courts may be under pressure from the public to be found guilty; In addition, U.S. service members who are invited to send shipments abroad should not be forced to waive their rights under the Rights Act. On the other hand, observers of the host country who do not have a local equivalent of the law of rights often feel that these are irrelevant excuses for special treatment and resemble the extraterritorial agreements demanded by Western countries during colonialism. A host country where such sentiment is widespread, South Korea, itself has forces in Kyrgyzstan and has negotiated a SOFA that gives its members total immunity from prosecution by the Kyrgyz authorities for any crime, which goes far beyond the privileges that many South Koreans enter into their country`s couch with the United States.  The status of armed forces agreements concluded in the framework of European security and defence cooperation reveals their most interesting aspects, based on international practice as a whole. On the one hand, they confirm international practice on two important points. Firstly, the different content of the EU sofa and the SOFA/SOMA EU model confirms that the legal status of foreign armed forces is not subject to international regulation, a point I have addressed in more detail elsewhere on this issue. The concessions that EU Member States were willing to make with each other in the EU are clearly not likely to regulate their relations with third countries in totally different operational circumstances. Secondly, the basic provisions of the EU sofa and the SOFA/SOMA MODEL, subject to a few notable exceptions, are closely linked to the terms of similar agreements, namely the NATO sofa and the UN SOFA model.
This congruence reflects more than a lack of imagination on the part of those who developed the EU agreements, but it is understandable to confirm the general applicability of the legal provisions contained in NATO`s SOFA and the UN SOFA model with similar operational circumstances.